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Marriage (In)equality and the Historical 
Legacies of Feminism 
Serena Mayeri* 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, marriage equality advocates won a spectacular 
victory, vanquishing the material and dignitary harms that same-sex 
marriage bans visited upon individuals and families. The product of a 
decades-long struggle for recognition, the legalization of same-sex marriage 
marked a triumph eminently worthy of celebration. But Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s majority opinion also felt bittersweet to many feminists and 
LGBT activists. Obergefell glorifies marriage as the apotheosis of human 
fulfillment and freedom, as fundamental to full citizenship and belonging. 
For those who sought sexual liberation and eschewed monogamy; who 
scorned marriage as a patriarchal, heterosexist, capitalist travesty; who wished 
to marry but could not; or who found personal fulfillment outside of 
intimate conjugal relationships, the opinion’s rhetoric rankled. Moreover, 
critics saw in Obergefell not merely an endorsement of inclusion and dignity 
for same-sex couples, but an implicit ratification of the legal and social 
privileges accorded to marital families and withheld from the nonmarried.1 The 
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FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2015); R. A. Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. 
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Obergefell opinion also troubled some who wished to find a more precise and 
generalizable doctrinal exposition of equal protection and due process 
principles in the opinion’s florid but somewhat nebulous paeans to liberty and 
equality.2 
For a legal historian of twentieth-century feminism, Obergefell’s 
valence is especially complex. This Essay measures Obergefell against two 
legacies of second-wave feminist legal advocacy: the largely successful 
campaign to make civil marriage formally gender-neutral, and the lesser-
known, less successful struggle against laws and practices that penalized 
women who lived their lives outside of marriage. Obergefell indirectly 
acknowledges marriage equality’s debt to the former legacy, and utterly 
disregards the latter. But the history of transformational change invoked 
in Obergefell suggests the potential for marriage equality to become more than 
an affirmation of marriage’s legal supremacy. 
*** 
The feminist legacy most apparent in Obergefell is the transformation of 
marriage law. Justice Kennedy’s opinion endorses wholeheartedly the 
historical account articulated by feminist scholars, most prominently Nancy 
Cott, since the turn of the twenty-first century.3 Marriage, on this view, is 
a dynamic institution, transformed since the Founding from an inegalitarian, 
racially exclusive, socially mandatory, and presumptively permanent status 
by state-level reforms and federal constitutional intervention. Exhibit A in 
this story of evolutionary change is the abolition of coverture and the 
replacement of highly differentiated and unequal rights and duties for 
husbands and wives with gender-neutral partnerships that spouses may enter 
and exit voluntarily. 
Historically, as a matter of formal law if not always social reality, 
marriage prescribed gender-differentiated and unequal roles for husbands 
and wives and the subordination of wives’ legal identity through coverture.4 
The reigning marital bargain required men to provide economic support to 
their wives and children; in exchange, women owed their husbands 
personal services such as homemaking, caregiving, and consortium. At 
 
 2. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Supreme Court Made the Right Call on Marriage 
Equality—But They Did It the Wrong Way, SALON (June 29, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/06/ 
29/the_supreme_court_made_the_right_call_on_marriage_equality_%E2%80%94_but_they_did_it_t
he_wrong_way [http://perma.cc/6JSZ-WT4G]. 
 3. See, e.g., Summary: Work of the House Judiciary Committee for the Week of 
January 17–21, 2000, Vermont House of Representatives, available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/ 
baker/jan17.htm [http://perma.cc/2FZ3-43E4] (summarizing Cott’s testimony); Expert Report of 
Nancy F. Cott, Ph.D., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Case No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 
2009); Brief for Historians of Marriage and the American Historical Association as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14–556, 14–562, 14–
571, 14-574). 
 4. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 
(2000). 
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common law, married women could not make contracts, hold property in their 
own names, sue or be sued. A husband’s prerogatives included the right to 
determine the family’s domicile, to chastise wayward dependents, and to 
demand sexual access to his wife. 
Thanks both to feminist struggle and broader economic and social 
changes, many of married women’s formal legal disabilities receded over 
the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Married 
Women’s Property Acts, the Nineteenth Amendment, and early 
antidiscrimination laws blunted the sharpest edges of coverture.5 But as late 
as 1961 the Supreme Court famously declared that women’s role “as the 
center of home and family life” justified exempting them from jury service,6 
and the sex-differentiated laws of marriage and divorce remained on the 
books in most jurisdictions.7 Laws and government policies, including the 
provision of key social insurance benefits, not only assumed but encouraged 
and rewarded a male breadwinner/female homemaker division of labor.8 
The reigning liberal consensus followed the 1965 Moynihan Report in 
recommending that black families adopt this white middle-class patriarchal 
ideal or risk a dismal descent into poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.9 By 
the 1970s, many policy makers worried that the “culture of pathology” 
that Moynihan saw in the “Negro family” would spread across American 
society if women achieved the equal employment opportunity feminists 
sought.10 
Feminists such as Pauli Murray and Eleanor Holmes Norton 
countered with their own vision of family life, anchored by the egalitarian 
marriages African American middle-class families pioneered.11 They 
insisted that women’s equal opportunity in the workplace and at home 
was essential, not antithetical, to racial progress, and that black women’s 
strength and self-sufficiency could serve as a model for white women 
constrained by restrictive sex-role expectations. A litigation campaign led 
by law professor and ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote this 
 
 5. Even today, remnants of coverture persist in family law. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, 
FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED, 97–132 (2014). 
 6. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). 
 7. On the limitations of nineteenth-century legal reforms, see, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, 
NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES (1998); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The 
First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 
1073 (1994). 
 8. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST 
FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001). 
 9. See Serena Mayeri, Historicizing the ‘End of Men’: The Politics of Reaction(s), 93 
B.U. L. REV. 729, 730 n.10 (2013) and sources cited therein. 
 10. See id. at 737–38. 
 11. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION 41–75 (2011). 
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vision of egalitarian marriage into constitutional law.12 Though feminists did 
not win ratification of the federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), they 
achieved many of the ERA’s original goals through state-level reforms to 
marriage and divorce law, and through federal and state constitutional rulings 
that applied heightened judicial scrutiny to sex-based classifications.13 In 
cases such as Frontiero v. Richardson,14 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,15 and 
Califano v. Goldfarb,16 Ginsburg and her allies persuaded the Court that the 
federal government could not constitutionally distinguish between husbands 
and wives or between widows and widowers in the allocation of military and 
Social Security benefits. By the 1980s, as a matter of formal law—though not 
of social reality—feminist advocacy made marriage a gender-neutral 
institution, a presumptively equal partnership of spouses with identical, 
reciprocal legal rights and responsibilities.17 
Obergefell invokes this feminist legacy in two related ways. First, 
Justice Kennedy politely but clearly rejects respondents’ contention that 
“[m]arriage . . . is by its nature a gender differentiated union of man and 
woman.”18 Second, he does so by adopting historical accounts of 
marriage’s evolution that foreground a progressive shift toward gender 
egalitarianism. Citing the work of Nancy Cott and others, Kennedy affirms 
that “[t]he history of marriage is one of both continuity and change.”19 His 
foremost example is male supremacy within marriage: “Under the centuries-
old doctrine of coverture,” he writes, “a married man and woman were treated 
by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity.”20 But, “[a]s women 
gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society began to 
understand that women have their own equal dignity, the law of coverture 
was abandoned.”21 Kennedy clarifies that “[t]hese and other developments in 
the institution of marriage . . . were not mere superficial changes. Rather, they 
worked deep transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage 
long viewed by many as essential.”22 Later, the opinion describes how 
 
 12. On Ginsburg’s litigation campaign, see id. especially at 41–185; see also Cary Franklin, 
The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(2010). 
 13. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
 14. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 15. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 16. 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 17. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 14–16; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating a 
sex-specific Alabama alimony law). Of course, legal sex neutrality did not necessarily ameliorate, and 
in some cases may have aggravated, sex inequality. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: 
The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). 
 19. Id. at 2595. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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“invidious sex-based classifications in marriage remained common through the 
mid-20th century,” and how “the Court invoked equal protection principles to 
invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage.”23 Citations to 
Ginsburg’s brief in Reed v. Reed24 and to more than half a dozen cases she 
championed as a litigator support the majority’s contention that “the Equal 
Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution 
of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the 
Constitution.”25 
Kennedy’s opinion could have been far more precise in drawing the 
doctrinal connections between constitutional sex discrimination law and the 
constitutional imperative of same-sex marriage. Since the 1980s, scholars 
and advocates have elaborated several compelling sex equality arguments 
against sexual orientation discrimination generally and same-sex marriage 
exclusions in particular.26 Until recently, most courts have given short shrift to 
these claims.27 But Judge Marsha Berzon’s concurring opinion in the 2014 
Ninth Circuit case Latta v. Otter provided a sophisticated elaboration of the 
contention that same-sex marriage bans “not only classify based on sex, but 
also, implicitly and explicitly, draw on ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ about 
the purportedly distinctive roles and abilities of men and women.”28 
Indeed, the centerpieces of Ginsburg’s 1970s litigation campaign—
Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, Goldfarb—had established the constitutional infirmity 
of sex-based discrimination in government benefits available to spouses, as 
Kennedy’s opinion acknowledged.29 Obergefell suggests that the laws 
challenged in these sex equality cases were broadly analogous to same-sex 
marriage bans in their violation of equal protection. The opinion does not, 
however, address directly the argument that same-sex marriage bans are 
 
 23. Id. at 2603. 
 24. Id. (citing Brief for Appellant at 69–88, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4)). 
 25. Id. at 2604 (citing, inter alia, Califano v. Westcott, Califano v. Goldfarb, Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, and Frontiero v. Richardson). 
 26. For early examples, see Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians 
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing that laws that 
discriminate based on sexual orientation “reinforce the hierarchy of males over females”); Sylvia A. 
Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187 (arguing that 
homophobia stems from the violation of gender norms, not merely disapproval of same-sex sexual 
conduct, and that “legal censure of homosexuality violates constitutional norms of gender equality”). 
For a review and analysis of sex discrimination arguments in marriage equality litigation, see 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in Social-Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex 
Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 2087 (2014). 
 27. Notable exceptions include Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (adopting expert witness Nancy Cott’s historical account of coverture’s demise 
wholesale and explaining marriage bans as unconstitutional discrimination based on sex as well 
as sexual orientation); and Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 257–59 (1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (explaining how State’s justifications for prohibiting same-sex marriage “reflect 
outdated sex-role stereotyping”). 
 28. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479–497 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 29. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
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unconstitutional for substantially the same reason: because the sex-based 
classifications they create reinforce the notion that husbands and wives perform 
distinct, sex-specific roles within marriage.30 Notwithstanding the many 
available doctrinal paths to calling same-sex marriage bans sex 
discrimination, Kennedy’s opinion relied instead on the potent but 
analytically hazy hybrid of due process and equal protection that animated 
his earlier gay rights decisions.31 
The omission of a sex or sexual orientation discrimination analysis in 
Obergefell understandably disappointed many observers. The opinion’s 
focus on the exalted status of marriage and its singular importance to human 
dignity caused some to wonder whether Obergefell spoke to the larger goal 
of eliminating discrimination throughout American law and society. 
Moreover, without a declaration that heightened scrutiny should apply to 
all sexual orientation-based classifications, it seemed possible to confine 
Obergefell’s analysis to marriage and leave other injustices untouched. And 
one could only imagine the restraint it must have required for Justice 
Kennedy’s three female colleagues—widowed, divorced, and never 
married, feminists all—to refrain from writing a single separate 
concurrence.32 Even the Obergefell Court’s cryptic historical summary 
obscured the centuries of feminist struggle that led “society” to “abandon” 
coverture. And yet—the gender egalitarian vision of marriage invoked by 
Obergefell is, unmistakably, a direct legacy of feminist legal advocacy and of 
the constitutional sex equality revolution that then-lawyer and professor 
Ginsburg and her allies secured. 
*** 
Second-wave feminism has another legacy—one with a much more 
tenuous constitutional foothold—that is in profound tension with 
Obergefell. Even as feminists won important constitutional victories for 
gender neutrality in the provision of government benefits and secured 
state-level reforms to the law of marriage, they also struggled—less 
visibly—against laws that penalized unmarried women. Feminists attacked 
policies and practices that excluded women with nonmarital children from 
employment and housing, denied them government benefits, and forced 
mothers to reveal the identity of their children’s father.33 Feminists argued 
 
 30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 32. In an interview with Neil Siegel shortly after the Obergefell decision, Justice Ginsburg 
explained her belief that “[p]erhaps … in this case it was more powerful to have the same, single 
opinion.” Samantha Lachman & Ashley Alman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Reflects on a Polarizing Term 
One Month Out, HUFF. POST, July 29, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ruth-bader-
ginsburg-tk_55b97c68e4b0b8499b18536b [http://perma.cc/94PW-JUGN]. 
 33. See Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital 
Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015). 
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that laws which discriminated against “illegitimate” children in fact 
burdened the mothers who were primarily responsible for their care and 
support.34 In law review articles, legal briefs, and personal testimonies, they 
explained how and why penalties for nonmarital sex and childbearing 
subordinated women, especially poor women and women of color.35 Some of 
these feminists challenged marital supremacy itself, questioned the 
privatization of dependence in the nuclear family, and contested the 
assumption that women and children should rely on men—or “the Man”—
for economic sustenance.36 Others sought to reframe nonmarital motherhood 
as a noble enterprise replete with hard work and sacrifice worthy of 
recognition and celebration rather than denigration and devaluation.37 
Those who challenged illegitimacy penalties and other discrimination 
against unmarried women enjoyed only limited success, and fell largely 
under the constitutional radar. But their arguments resonate with even 
greater urgency today as an ever-widening marriage gap separates the 
wealthy, educated, married haves from the increasingly impoverished 
unmarried have-nots.38 Just as gender egalitarian marriage became a real 
possibility for highly educated professional couples, marriage itself 
increasingly seemed out of reach for many low-income women and women 
of color. This growing marriage gap between rich and poor, white and black, 
meant that the families most in need of now sex-neutral benefits could 
not receive them. For example, when Margaret Gonzales, an unmarried 
mother, tried to obtain the same insurance benefits Ginsburg and her client 
Stephen Wiesenfeld had won for widowed husbands and fathers, the Supreme 
Court ruled that marital status was a perfectly constitutional basis on which to 
deny government benefits.39 
Meanwhile, the formal gender equality that now applied to married 
couples did not extend to the unmarried. For example, equitable division 
of marital property at dissolution did not apply to most unmarried 
cohabitants, leaving unmarried women who had made financial sacrifices to 
care for home and children with nothing.40 The partial and incomplete shift 
 
 34. See Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33. 
 35. See, e.g., Brief for Equal Rights Advocates Inc. and ACLU as Amici Curiae at 9–11, 
Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 425 U.S. 559 (1976) (No. 74-1318), 1974 WL 
175944. 
 36. See, e.g., Aleta Wallach & Patricia Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried 
Women and their Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, and the 
Uniform Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 23 (1974); Johnnie Tillmon, Welfare is a Women’s Issue 
(1972), MS. MAGAZINE, Spring 2002. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS 
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33. 
 39. See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33. 
 40. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law 
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709 (1996). 
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toward gender egalitarian parenting within marriage did not extend to 
nonmarital families, where both law and social practice vest primary rights 
and responsibilities in mothers.41 A coalition of feminists and fiscal 
conservatives won better child support enforcement,42 but the limited sums 
low-income fathers could contribute went largely to the government, 
offsetting welfare expenditures rather than benefiting poor women and their 
children.43 The Supreme Court struck down much discrimination against 
so-called “illegitimate” children, but never questioned the legitimacy of 
discriminating against their parents, or of privileging marriage over non-
marriage more generally.44 
The persistent legal privileging of marriage reinforced existing 
inequalities of race, class, and gender. Tying social supports to conjugal 
partnership—marital or not—meant that many poor women and women of 
color suffered a double disadvantage, because they lacked partners likely to 
be eligible for employment- related benefits in the first place.45 Since the 
1970s, income inequality, mass incarceration, and chronic unemployment 
have intersected with divergent marriage rates to widen the chasm between 
highly educated women who could aspire to gender egalitarian partnerships 
with affluent male peers, and their impoverished counterparts, who no longer 
could count on sharing the burdens of raising children in poverty with a 
partner, much less rely on a second income.46 
The triumph of marriage equality has radical, transformative 
potential. But it may or may not be a step toward marriage equality writ 
large. Ideally, the legalization of same-sex marriage heralds a new era of 
family pluralism, in which individuals and families of all kinds flourish 
regardless of their formal structure. Conjugal relationships—marital and non- 
marital, gay, straight, and queer—become more egalitarian, and the state 
supports not only conjugal unions but other relationships of care and 
mutual support.47 Rather than privileging marriage, laws and policies attempt to 
sever the link between family structure and socioeconomic status.48 
 
 41. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the 
Age of Equality, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016); Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33. 
 42. See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, THE POLITICS OF CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA (2003). 
 43. See, e.g., Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best 
Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029 (2007); Ann 
Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 127 (2011). 
 44. Mayeri, Marital Supremacy, supra note 33. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Cf. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004); 
LAW COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE ADULT 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (2001); Nancy D. Polikoff, Law That Values All Families: Beyond 
(Straight and Gay) Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 85 (2009). 
 48. Cf. MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND 
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS (2010) (arguing that families in all their diverse forms will be unable 
to flourish without government support). Such a transformation may require that individuals receive 
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Many marriage skeptics fear another, bleaker scenario.49 The extension 
of marriage rights to same-sex couples reinforces and entrenches the legal 
privileging of marriage at the expense of individuals and families who 
cannot, or do not wish to, marry.50 Instead of propelling heterosexual 
couples toward more gender egalitarian partnerships, marriage pushes same-
sex couples to replicate gender specialization, alleviating pressure on the state 
and on employers to help families integrate breadwinning and caregiving.51 
Now that marriage is an option for same-sex couples, progressive legal 
doctrines extending parental rights to non-biological parents are 
unavailable to unmarried gay parents.52 Creative legal alternatives to 
marriage, such as domestic partnership benefits, disappear.53 Individuals who 
remain uncoupled, and couples who choose not to marry, are subjected to 
social and economic pressure and penalty. With marriage theoretically 
available to all, the legal privileging of marriage appears unproblematic, and 
policy makers continue to promote marriage as a solution to poverty. The 
marriage gap widens, reinforcing the intersecting inequalities of race, 
gender, class, and sexual identity. 
*** 
Obergefell does not bear the marks of feminism’s second legacy—the 
campaigns against discrimination based on nonmarital status. Instead, 
 
support by virtue of their citizenship, rather than accessing benefits through their status as family 
members.  Cf. Jyl Josephson, Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage, and Feminist Critiques of Marriage, 3 
PERSP. ON POL. 269 (2005). 
 49. Marriage skepticism, of course, does not imply opposition to the legalization of same-sex 
marriage. See Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 37 (2011). On 
the salutary collateral consequences of the marriage equality movement, see, for example, Cary 
Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817 
(2014). 
 50. Some marriage skeptics also fear that marriage will subject same-sex couples to 
oppressive state regulation, as it has other historically subordinated groups. See, e.g., KATHERINE 
FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2015); Lenhardt, supra note 1. 
 51. For an early debate on the potential of same-sex marriage to disrupt gender role 
specialization within marriage, compare Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist 
Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9 (1991), with Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why 
Legalizing Lesbian and Gay Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every 
Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993). For a sampling of more recent treatments, see Katherine 
Franke, Lesbian Husbands and Gay Wives: The Gendering of Gay Divorce, THE NATION, July 3, 
2013; Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721 (2012); 
Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 52. Cf. Cynthia Grant Bowman, The New Illegitimacy: Children of Cohabiting Couples and 
Stepchildren, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 437 (2012); Nancy D. Polikoff, The New 
Illegitimacy: Winning Backward in the Protection of Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721 (2012). 
 53. For various perspectives on the history of domestic partnerships and their relationship to 
marriage, see, for example, ELIZABETH H. PLECK, NOT JUST ROOMMATES: COHABITATION AFTER 
THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION (2012); Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of 
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87 (2014); Melissa 
Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went From Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 291 (2013). 
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Kennedy’s opinion elevates and ennobles marriage in terms that implicitly 
disparage nonmarriage. He laments the fate of children with unmarried 
parents as inherently difficult and demeaning.54 He provides no generalizable 
theory of equality based on sex or sexual orientation that might obviously 
apply to discrimination in employment, housing, or nonmarital sexual 
relationships. A pessimistic reader might conclude that Obergefell invites 
same-sex couples to enjoy the privileges of marital supremacy, but does little 
to enhance liberty and equality outside the institution of marriage. 
And yet—history also suggests that marriage skeptics should not 
despair. After all, a half-century before Obergefell, the Court paid homage 
to marriage as 
a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that 
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it 
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions.55 
The case, of course, was Griswold v. Connecticut, where Justice William 
O. Douglas planted the seeds of a dramatic and wide-ranging constitutional 
transformation in, of all places, “the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.”56 
Arguably, the right to privacy was Griswold’s core principle, its language 
about marriage little more than a rhetorical flourish soon jettisoned in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, where Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. embraced the “right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”57 Similarly, Obergefell might come to stand 
for the core principle that due process and equal protection forbid 
exclusionary laws that demean and reinforce the subordinate status of 
historically marginalized groups. Theoretically, at least, this principle would 
apply not only to other discrimination based on sexual orientation, but also to 
laws that exclude nonmarried individuals and families from obtaining the 
benefits available to the married. 
In the wake of a resounding victory that seemed unimaginable even a 
decade ago, to assume that the constitutional die is cast, that advocates of 
social change are powerless to affect Obergefell’s legacy, risks becoming a 
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self-fulfilling, and self-defeating, prophecy.58 After all, “society” did not 
magically “abandon” coverture. Generations of feminists, often laboring 
in obscurity, vanquished it, and one of them now sits on the Supreme 
Court. Indeed, the very constitutional indeterminacy that scholars and 
advocates understandably bemoan as a jurisprudential liability could create 
opportunities for innovative constitutional and extraconstitutional arguments 
that call into question marriage’s legal primacy. And if the internal 
architecture of marriage can evolve not only to accommodate same-sex 
relationships but to require their recognition as a matter of constitutional 
law, perhaps the status of marriage as legally superior to all other family 
forms need not remain frozen in time. 
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